Westinghouse AP1000 reactors are at the center of a U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement that breaks with decades of American nonproliferation policy, according to analysis from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The accord, formally known as a 123 agreement after the relevant section of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, departs significantly from the so-called gold standard Washington has applied to previous nuclear partnerships in the Middle East.
The agreement’s most consequential provisions concern what Saudi Arabia will not be required to do. Unlike prior nuclear negotiations with the kingdom and other regional partners, this deal reportedly does not mandate that Riyadh forgo enrichment and reprocessing activities that could support a nuclear weapons program. It also does not require Saudi Arabia to accept the Additional Protocol, the highest standard of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards that over 140 states have already adopted. These omissions represent the core departures from U.S. nuclear policy standards, particularly significant given the region’s history of covert weapons programs and Saudi leaders’ explicit statements that the kingdom would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran acquires them.
The timing adds layers of complexity. The deal emerges amid an ongoing U.S. military conflict with Iran and follows the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks and Israel’s war in Gaza, which derailed a broader diplomatic initiative that would have bundled nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia’s normalization with Israel under the Abraham Accords framework. During the Biden administration, civil nuclear cooperation was positioned as part of a larger effort to reorder Middle Eastern relations. That broader bargain collapsed. The nuclear file has now moved forward on narrower terms.
The U.S. nuclear industry stands to benefit substantially. The administration has framed the agreement as establishing a legal foundation for a decades-long, multi-billion-dollar nuclear energy partnership, with Saudi Arabia expected to purchase American nuclear technology and effectively exclude Russian and Chinese suppliers from a strategically important market. For the Trump administration, finalizing this agreement and pursuing additional 123 agreements is part of an ambitious plan to revive the ailing U.S. nuclear industry and regain competitive ground against rivals that leverage their nuclear exports for global influence.
Uncertainty clouds several critical aspects of the deal. The full text has not been released publicly, and conflicting statements from President Donald Trump have created confusion about whether enrichment is permitted. Trump has posted on social media denying that the agreement permits enrichment, contradicting initial reporting that suggested the deal would allow enrichment pending conclusions of a joint U.S.-Saudi study on economic viability. Whether Saudi Arabia and the administration agree on this fundamental point remains unclear.
The agreement also contains provisions that administration officials describe as bespoke bilateral safeguards intended to compensate for the absence of the Additional Protocol. Critics in the nuclear policy community express deep concern, noting that it is difficult to assess their adequacy without reviewing the full text. Some experts worry that Saudi Arabia could agree to safeguards that function similarly to the Additional Protocol without formally adopting it, raising questions about why such an arrangement would be necessary at all.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s response has been notably cautious regarding Trump’s subsequent statements conditioning the deal on Abraham Accords normalization. Initial Saudi reactions to the announcement were triumphant, with media outlets and commentators hailing a historic accord. When Trump shifted course and began conditioning the deal on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, Saudi officials responded with silence rather than engagement. Local media instead focused on Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s supportive comments and Trump’s condemnation of Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.
The agreement’s precedent effects concern nuclear policy experts on a broader level. The decision to exempt Saudi Arabia from the Additional Protocol undermines longstanding international efforts to push for universal adoption of more rigorous IAEA safeguards designed to make concealing a nuclear weapons program more difficult. The enrichment question remains particularly contentious. Experts note that states with much larger nuclear programs have concluded that purchasing enriched uranium from global markets is cheaper than producing it domestically, making the fact that this door remains even slightly open, given the mismatch between Saudi Arabia’s enrichment aspirations and the actual scale of its nascent nuclear program, a central reason the nuclear policy community views the agreement with alarm.
The agreement’s impact on other regional states will bear close watching. The UAE’s reaction may prove especially significant: its 2009 nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States included a clause allowing Abu Dhabi to renegotiate restrictions if another regional state secured more permissive terms. Whether the UAE moves to invoke that clause could determine how far the erosion of U.S. nonproliferation standards in the Middle East ultimately goes.