Saudi Arabia’s 30-year nuclear cooperation framework with the United States, signed Wednesday by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman, marks the Gulf kingdom’s formal entry into a regional infrastructure race that already spans multiple countries at very different stages of construction, operation, and ambition.
The agreement, known as a 123 agreement under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, authorizes American companies to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and establishes a separate bilateral safeguards arrangement. The exact operational parameters remain undisclosed, though analysts suggest the safeguards mechanism may include provisions for American inspectors to monitor uranium enrichment levels and ensure they remain within civilian reactor specifications rather than approaching weapons-grade concentrations.
The deal now moves to Congress for a 90-day review. Objections are expected from some legislators, but they are likely to represent a minority, meaning the agreement takes effect automatically unless Congress acts to block it. US reactor manufacturers, particularly Westinghouse, stand to benefit from the contract.
Operational uncertainties remain. Saudi Arabia is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 48-nation cartel controlling nuclear commerce, raising questions about how the kingdom will access essential technology and uranium supplies. The International Atomic Energy Agency was not party to the bilateral agreement, leaving enforcement mechanisms for proliferation safeguards unclear.
The Middle East nuclear landscape extends well beyond Saudi Arabia’s nascent programme. The UAE operates the region’s most developed civilian nuclear infrastructure. The Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant, completed in 2012, houses four South Korean-designed reactors using US technology and generates approximately 5,600 megawatts of electricity, roughly one quarter of the UAE’s total demand. The IAEA maintains full access to Barakah with real-time monitoring cameras. The UAE signed its own 123 agreement with the US in 2009 and committed contractually to forgo domestic uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, both pathways to weapons development.
By contrast, Turkey’s Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, designed and maintained by Russia, produces up to 4,800 megawatts, about 10 percent of Turkey’s electricity supply. Under that arrangement, Turkey lacks access to spent fuel, a critical ingredient for weapons development. Turkey is a NATO member hosting US nuclear weapons and has historically relied on that deterrent. Following the US-Israel military campaign against Iran beginning in February 2025, however, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan signaled the country could pursue nuclear weapons acquisition, a significant rhetorical shift. A Research Istanbul poll conducted during the Iran conflict showed 71 percent of respondents favored nuclear weapons development.
Egypt is constructing the El-Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant with Russian oversight and design. The facility is expected to generate up to 4,800 megawatts by 2028. Like Turkey, Russia maintains control over Egypt’s spent nuclear fuel. Egypt also operates research reactors for medical isotope production.
Iran’s nuclear programme has undergone dramatic operational disruption. The country launched its civilian nuclear infrastructure in 1957 with US assistance under President Dwight Eisenhower’s technology-sharing initiative, and the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was developed by German companies. The IAEA discovered in the early 2000s that Iran had secretly constructed uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow with Pakistani assistance, triggering UN Security Council sanctions and covert operations including cyberattacks and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.
In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, limiting uranium enrichment to just over 3 percent and granting the IAEA unprecedented monitoring access. The IAEA and US intelligence agencies repeatedly confirmed Iran’s compliance. The US withdrew from the agreement in 2018 under President Donald Trump, reinstating sanctions, and Iran subsequently increased enrichment levels. In June 2025, after an IAEA report indicated Iran had accumulated more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, the US and Israel launched military strikes on Iran’s three primary nuclear facilities. A second military campaign in February 2025 was explicitly intended to degrade Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Trump claimed the strikes “obliterated” Iran’s programme. The UN reinstated sanctions on Iran in August.
Israel maintains the region’s most advanced nuclear arsenal, though it refuses official acknowledgment. The country is not an NPT signatory and has rejected IAEA assessment since the 1980s. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative think tank, Israel has possessed nuclear weapons since the 1960s and maintains approximately 90 warheads, with sufficient uranium and plutonium stockpiles to produce up to 300 additional weapons. The Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona, built with French assistance in 1957, serves as Israel’s primary nuclear facility. Satellite imagery from 2025 showed expansion work at Dimona even as Israel conducted military operations against Iran.
Pakistan, positioned at the Middle East’s periphery, operates an advanced nuclear arsenal of approximately 170 warheads as deterrence against India, which possesses roughly 190. Pakistan expanded its programme following a brief armed conflict with India in May 2025. Neither country is an NPT signatory. Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, centered at the Kahuta and Gadwal uranium enrichment facilities, was largely developed by physicist Abdul Qader Khan, who secured black-market uranium procurement networks. Pakistan has transferred nuclear technology and weapons to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
Iraq dismantled its military nuclear programme following the 2003 US-led invasion and now seeks partnerships with China and Russia to construct civilian power plants, driven by chronic electricity shortages. Whether Saudi Arabia’s new framework accelerates similar civilian ambitions elsewhere in the region, or sharpens concerns about the adequacy of existing safeguards, may depend on what the still-undisclosed operational parameters of Wednesday’s agreement actually require.