Gulf States Face Pressure as Iran Escalates Strikes; Retaliation Window Narrows

Gulf states are absorbing a fresh wave of Iranian strikes, and the question of how long they can hold their response to a simmer is becoming harder to answer.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps acknowledged on Monday that it launched attacks on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan, claiming to have targeted US military facilities and assets within those countries. The strikes represent a further escalation of Iran’s campaign since the collapse of its Memorandum of Understanding with Washington, part of a broader pattern that includes efforts to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz and sustained attacks on commercial shipping.

Ahmed Alkhuzaie, Managing Partner at the Washington-based Khuzaie Associates LLC consultancy, outlined the operational constraints facing Gulf governments. Full-scale offensive operations remain outside the normal posture of these states. Even so, Alkhuzaie told The Jerusalem Post that “the possibility of limited strikes, heightened maritime patrols, or covert actions cannot be ruled out if provocations continue.”

The calibration problem is real. Gulf nations would likely shape any response to avoid uncontrolled escalation while simultaneously signaling that their security concerns cannot be dismissed. “The strategic imperative for these states is to balance deterrence with stability, ensuring that Iran understands the costs of continued aggression,” Alkhuzaie said.

Any coordinated military action would flow through the Peninsula Shield Force, the joint military command structure of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Alkhuzaie described the force as representing both shared military capacity and political cohesion among member states. It has undergone modernization and now encompasses ground troops, air support and naval capabilities. Its existence means Gulf states can mobilize collectively rather than act in isolation, amplifying deterrent power and projecting unity.

Individual Gulf states bring substantial assets of their own. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess leading military capabilities suited to a collective deterrent posture. Kuwait, traditionally cautious in its foreign policy, maintains a capable defensive force. The broader security architecture includes US military presence throughout the region, Oman’s geographic proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, and Bahrain’s role as host to the US Fifth Fleet, which provides pivotal maritime security support.

“Together, these nations form a layered security network that extends beyond sheer military might,” Alkhuzaie said. “Their collective geography, commanding chokepoints, coastlines, and airspace, adds strategic weight to any potential response. Their political cohesion within the GCC, reinforced by the Peninsula Shield Force, ensures that even smaller states can amplify their influence through collective action.”

Meanwhile, a recent episode at Sanaa International Airport illustrates the kind of indirect action already in play. The runway attack was initially attributed to Saudi Arabia but later acknowledged by Yemen’s defense ministry as a Yemeni operation aimed at preventing an Iranian plane from landing. When asked whether targeting Iranian proxies could strike the right balance between responding to Tehran and avoiding wider escalation, Alkhuzaie suggested Gulf states were already moving in that direction. “Our economies suffered enough,” he said. “We can’t keep getting hit forever.”

By contrast, Mojtaba Dehghani, an Iranian analyst on Middle Eastern affairs, offered a more cautious read on the likelihood of direct Gulf military action. He acknowledged that Gulf state tolerance for Iranian aggression is shrinking, but predicted that an open, unilateral military response remains unlikely in the near term. He expects instead an “indirect and layered response” involving increased coordination with the US, enhanced air defense integration, intelligence sharing and strengthened maritime security.

Dehghani noted that Gulf states remain primarily focused on preserving stability, maintaining investment confidence and protecting the region’s image as insulated from wider conflict. Diplomatic pressure would continue flowing through Oman and Qatar, he said, with Gulf states avoiding the appearance of leading a war against Iran.

“The threshold for a direct response would likely be much higher,” Dehghani outlined. He cited potential triggers: large-scale casualties on Persian Gulf soil, major attacks on Saudi or Emirati energy infrastructure, a prolonged closure of Hormuz, or clear evidence that US deterrence has failed. Until such circumstances emerge, he predicted Gulf states would allow Washington to carry the visible military burden while quietly strengthening their own defenses.

The bind, as Dehghani framed it, is structural. These states need protection from Iran while avoiding the heightened vulnerability that comes with visibly aligning with a harder US-Israel security posture. Whether that balance holds depends largely on whether the IRGC’s strikes keep escalating, or whether Monday’s acknowledged attacks mark a ceiling rather than a new floor.