For the people who live along the Gulf, whose livelihoods depend on open shipping lanes, working ports, functioning desalination plants and reliable energy exports, the question of how regional states manage their disputes is not abstract diplomacy. It is a matter of daily safety and economic survival. That is the stake behind a proposal now on the table: a non-aggression pact among all eight Gulf littoral states, floated by Oman’s Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, in a recent lecture at Cambridge University in the UK. He called for an agreement binding the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council together with Iraq and Iran, describing it as the essential prerequisite for an inclusive regional security architecture.
The case for such an arrangement rests on a simple premise that touches every household in the region: when security frameworks are underdeveloped, ordinary people bear the cost of escalation. The current conflict has proved so difficult to resolve precisely because the region has relied for too long on external powers rather than on an agreement of its own making. As another major escalation looms between Iran and the United States, the need for a diplomatic path forward has become urgent.
The idea is not new. In November 1976, the foreign ministers of all eight Gulf littoral states met in Muscat to pursue collective security after Britain’s withdrawal from the region. That remains the only time all eight have sat at one table. The Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war subsequently pushed the region towards defensive arrangements that hardened into exclusion, leaving Iran viewed for decades as a threat by the rest of the region. Yet with the country holding roughly half the Gulf coastline, any security architecture without it is structurally unsound, a gap that ultimately touches everyone who depends on the Gulf’s waterways.
Renewed interest came in 2019. In May of that year, then Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif proposed a regional non-aggression pact with Gulf neighbours during a visit to Baghdad, an idea endorsed by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. That September, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani launched the Hormuz Peace Endeavour, known as HOPE, at the UN General Assembly, envisaging a pact among Hormuz states. Gulf reactions were largely dismissive at the time, citing Iranian support for armed groups threatening regional stability.
The idea has since gained traction on the Arab side. In May, the Financial Times reported that Saudi Arabia was discussing a non-aggression framework with Iran, reportedly modelled on the Helsinki process between the US and Russia during the Cold War. This month, Qatar’s defence minister called for GCC-Iran dialogue, joined by Turkiye and Pakistan, towards a non-aggression agreement. Oman’s proposal is the latest iteration of this shift, and Muscat is well placed to mediate given its history as an intermediary and its recent record of hosting US-Iran talks in 2025 and February 2026.
Scepticism is warranted, and Oman itself has felt the consequences of regional insecurity, having formally protested to Iran after drone attacks targeting Musandam and Al Wusta in July. Gulf concerns about Iranian actions are not misunderstandings. For this reason, reassurance alone is insufficient; inclusion must mean obligation. A pact would need to bind Iran as much as any other signatory, resting on observable conduct, reciprocal restraint and consequences for violations. At minimum, it would require commitments against the threat or use of force, interference in internal affairs, attacks on civilian infrastructure and support for armed groups conducting cross-border attacks, alongside protection of navigation.
A gradual approach could begin with consultations among the eight countries to identify minimum shared interests: territorial security, functioning ports, reliable energy exports, civilian protection and uninterrupted trade. Oman can facilitate, but each state would represent itself, since Muscat’s channel to Tehran confers no mandate to negotiate for its neighbours. Early measures might include military hotlines, rules for maritime encounters, notification of exercises and rapid communication after attacks. An understanding on protecting energy facilities, desalination plants and commercial shipping would offer an early test of compliance.
Hormuz is the obvious starting point. Oman-Iran talks have already outlined a temporary navigation arrangement, though as Albusaidi conceded it cannot be implemented unless Washington and Tehran compromise, including by reversing wartime actions that halted maritime traffic. Armed groups would be the hardest issue, requiring governments to neither direct nor materially support cross-border attacks and to demonstrate compliance through verifiable steps. Compliance could later open cooperation on maritime safety, environmental protection and emergency response, while the right of self-defence would remain intact.
A regional pact would not settle every conflict. The United States and Israel, both parties to this year’s war on Iran, would remain outside it, and Yemen’s war involves actors a Gulf arrangement could not easily bind. But a framework need not end every war to be worth having; it need only make it harder for any of them to become a war among its signatories. Its credibility will rest on changed conduct: fewer attacks, functioning crisis channels and respect for sovereignty. Present hostilities make the task difficult, but they also expose the cost of postponing it. Whether the eight states can move from proposal to table may decide whether the next escalation is managed, or simply endured.