Trump's 60-Day Mideast Ceasefire Hinges on Reopening Hormuz Strait

A June 14 framework agreement between Washington and Tehran halted a war that began in late February, and three days later President Donald Trump signed a one-page memorandum of understanding at the Palace of Versailles. That document extends the ceasefire for 60 days, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, lifts dueling naval blockades, and halts military operations across the region including Lebanon. It also commits both powers to negotiate Iran’s nuclear program, uranium stockpile, and sanctions relief, with the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council states pledging to finance at least 300 billion dollars for Iran’s reconstruction, gradually lift nuclear-related and unilateral sanctions, and issue immediate waivers for Iranian oil and petrochemical exports once a final deal is reached.

That 60-day clock is now running. The window it opens is narrow, and the question for Gulf states is whether they can use it to negotiate their own security framework with Iran before Washington and Tehran settle the larger questions on their behalf.

Additional reference context is available at https://gulfif.org/the-case-for-a-gulf-iran-non-aggression-pact/.

Gulf leaders have welcomed the memorandum despite limited Iranian attacks against Gulf states continuing. Recent strikes on Kuwait and Bahrain have sharpened the urgency. The central question has shifted from whether a deal is achievable to whether the GCC can secure one that protects its territory, infrastructure, and economic ambitions. A non-aggression pact could prevent Gulf territory, airspace, maritime corridors, and critical infrastructure from becoming an operating theater for Israeli, American, and Iranian escalation, though reaching one would require coordinated GCC-wide effort.

Saudi Arabia holds the strongest position to advance this initiative. The kingdom has direct negotiation experience with Iran and maintains active communication channels with Tehran’s leadership. Riyadh has demonstrated remarkable restraint despite previous Iranian attacks on Saudi infrastructure, avoiding overt retaliation or militaristic rhetoric. That restraint positions the kingdom to lead a GCC-wide negotiation while bringing in other stakeholders including China, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. Reports suggest Saudi Arabia has already begun consulting Gulf partners and European actors on this direction.

The proposed framework appears modeled on the Helsinki Agreement, which established the foundation for Cold War détente between the Soviet Union and Western countries in 1975. A Gulf-Iran non-aggression pact would be a limited, security-focused agreement confined to the Gulf and adjacent areas. It would establish a baseline for GCC-Iran relations through mutual assurances: Gulf states would reaffirm that their territory and airspace will not support offensive operations against Iran, while Tehran would commit not to target Gulf states, their energy and civilian infrastructure, ports, or maritime corridors.

Three critical issues would require addressing. Territorial restraint would prohibit physical, cyber, or proxy attacks against either side’s territory and critical infrastructure. Maritime restraint would ban harassment, seizure, mining, or attacks on shipping through Gulf-administered waterways including the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Red Sea. Crisis management would establish a dedicated deconfliction and de-escalation channel supported by regional mediators such as Oman and Qatar, expandable to other signatories, to address potential violations before escalation occurs.

Digital infrastructure presents a likely gray area. Tehran argues that Gulf-based data centers support U.S. military targeting and surveillance operations against Iran. For GCC states, AI infrastructure represents a cornerstone of their economic transformation strategies and a major red line. The agreement would not require political reconciliation or strategic trust as preconditions. Rather, it would establish a narrow framework for near-term mutual restraint while leaving deeper security disputes unresolved.

Iran would continue its rivalry with the United States and Israel, while Saudi Arabia and the GCC would retain their security partnerships with Washington. Issues including U.S. military basing, GCC dependence on the U.S. security umbrella, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s support for proxy groups, and Iranian missile and drone capabilities would still require negotiation through this or parallel platforms.

Such a pact could provide Saudi Arabia with three strategic benefits. First, it would allow Riyadh to reassert leadership within the GCC and broader region by freezing the kinetic dimension of the conflict and creating space for renewed Saudi-UAE cooperation. This requires sustained outreach between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to de-escalate areas of competition while establishing a common framework for engaging Iran. A guaranteed reduction in Iranian attacks would likely encourage UAE support, especially if the framework manages the Strait of Hormuz.

Second, a non-aggression pact would reduce the economic costs of prolonged conflict. Gulf states’ domestic transformation agendas depend on regional stability, and deteriorating Saudi-UAE coordination has heightened Abu Dhabi’s insecurity. Israel has sought to exploit that insecurity by positioning itself as a key security partner to the UAE, widening the gap between the Gulf’s two largest economies. Yet Riyadh and Abu Dhabi share an interest in preventing the Gulf from becoming viewed as a permanent conflict zone. Sustained instability would undermine investor confidence and raise the cost of every major transformation project.

Third, a non-aggression pact could shift the Saudi-Iran rivalry from military confrontation back to geoeconomic competition. Saudi Arabia will not compete with Iran in open combat, as potential losses would jeopardize Vision 2030 and the diversification agenda underpinning regime legitimacy. Peacetime competition, by contrast, would allow Riyadh to compete through economic and diplomatic statecraft, particularly if U.S. and U.N. sanctions continue constraining Iran’s economy.

Significant barriers could obstruct success. Israel’s leadership could disrupt any Gulf-Iran de-escalation track. Netanyahu’s government continues treating perpetual war with Iran as politically useful, despite recent polling suggesting military action has not delivered expected political dividends ahead of October 2026 Israeli elections. Trump reinforced this dynamic by linking a U.S.-brokered ceasefire with Iran to Gulf normalization with Israel, telling Arab leaders he expected normalization in exchange for a ceasefire deal. Normalization remains a non-starter for Saudi Arabia and other non-signatory Gulf states of the Abraham Accords, which condition normalization on an irreversible path to Palestinian statehood. If Israel retains the ability to restart strikes at will, any Gulf-Iran understanding would remain fragile.

Iran could also undermine a non-aggression pact through selective escalation. Tehran may read Gulf restraint as evidence that its threat posture is working and sustain selective strike threats to preserve leverage. Gulf states would then face the choice between continued restraint and using force to restore deterrence. A non-aggression framework requires Iran to view Gulf restraint as voluntary accommodation rather than successful coercion, which means any agreement would require a clear, agreed-upon response to possible Iranian violations.

Intra-GCC fragmentation poses a third risk. The UAE-Saudi schism could undermine the coordination a non-aggression pact requires. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have signaled support for de-escalation once a legitimate U.S.-Iran ceasefire exists, and the memorandum now satisfies that condition. Without a coordinated GCC approach, Iran and Israel could exploit Gulf divisions, leaving the GCC unable to function as a coherent diplomatic bloc.

A GCC-Iran non-aggression pact will not end the war. It might, however, take the Gulf states out of it. If the Gulf waits for Washington and Tehran to settle larger questions before defining its own terms, it will inherit whatever bargain they strike. The 60-day window is the moment to act. Whether Riyadh and Abu Dhabi can convert their shared interest in de-escalation into a common negotiating position before that window closes is the operational question that will determine whether this opening amounts to anything at all.