Iranian missiles and drones were still striking targets in Bahrain and Kuwait even after Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding to end their war earlier this month. That operational fact, more than any diplomatic statement, captures the security crisis now reshaping how Gulf states think about defense.
The conflict, which erupted on February 28, saw Iranian forces hit military installations hosting American troops, civilian infrastructure, airports, energy facilities and hotels across the Gulf region. Iran also closed the Strait of Hormuz. The combination has forced Gulf capitals to confront a question they had long deferred: does US military presence in the region actually provide protection?
Additional reference context is available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/2/how-us-iran-war-may-push-gulf-countries-to-diversify-security-alliances.
Annelle Sheline, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, argues it did the opposite. “The presence of the US military in Gulf countries had the opposite of a deterrent effect. These military bases became targets,” she told Al Jazeera. She predicts Gulf states will now seek to deepen ties with China, Turkey and Europe while maintaining, but no longer depending solely on, the United States.
The diversification is already underway. Saudi Arabia signed a defense pact with Pakistan before the war began. Gulf states have spent years acquiring defense systems from European suppliers while cultivating relationships with Russia and China. Anna Jacobs Khalaf, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, describes the emerging approach as one centered on regional balance rather than a simple superpower swap. “The focus for countries like Saudi Arabia is the regional balance of power and pushing back on both Iran and Israel,” she told Al Jazeera. “This doesn’t mean replacing the US with Pakistan; it means diversifying partnerships and setting up platforms like the so-called quad group of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan. It also means developing their own domestic defensive capabilities and developing more regional autonomy.”
Iran is not the only threat Gulf capitals are tracking. Many also view Israel’s military posture as destabilizing. Last year, Israel bombed Doha in an attempt to target Hamas leaders during US-backed Gaza ceasefire negotiations. President Donald Trump said he was “very unhappy” with the strikes on Qatar, a major non-NATO ally, and denied approving or having prior knowledge of the attack. The episode made clear to Gulf governments that even close US partners could face Israeli military action without reliable American restraint.
Meanwhile, Gulf states have kept communication channels open with Tehran and are actively pursuing economic cooperation as a stabilizing mechanism. Several GCC members are moving to mend ties and deepen economic relations with Iran. Sheline argues that intertwined economic interests could ultimately prove more effective than military deterrence alone. “Gulf states are likely to try a different approach, whereby they try to make it more costly for Iran to strike them in the future by tying themselves more closely to Iran, such as through electricity infrastructure,” she said.
US Vice President JD Vance confirmed that this economic engagement is already taking shape. “The Emiratis are having conversations with the Iranians that have never happened before, including with the IRGC, about various types of economic incentives,” he said in a recent interview, describing discussions between the United Arab Emirates and the Revolutionary Guard Corps about investment conditions.
The broader US strategic posture adds its own layer of uncertainty. Trump’s National Security Strategy signals that Washington no longer prioritizes the Middle East, directing foreign policy resources toward the Western Hemisphere and other regions. Yet deep US commitments to Israel remain. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has resisted ceasefire demands embedded in the memorandum of understanding, particularly regarding Lebanon, and his allies in Washington have mobilized against the diplomatic agreement. Netanyahu has struck a careful balance, repeatedly thanking Trump for the war with Iran while signaling that Israel will pursue its own course in Lebanon and beyond.
Vance acknowledged divergence between US and Israeli interests while backing a separate US-brokered agreement between Lebanon and Israel that effectively grants Israel operational freedom in Lebanon until Hezbollah disarms, a position that sits uneasily alongside the broader ceasefire framework.
Jacobs Khalaf notes that Gulf discomfort with Israel runs deeper than the immediate conflict. “Many Gulf states feel very threatened by Israel’s increasingly aggressive posture in the region,” she said, citing Gaza operations, Palestinian occupation policies and attacks on Lebanon and Syria as sources of concern, even among states that have normalized relations with Israel.
The critical variable, Sheline argues, is Israel itself. If the ceasefire leads to a comprehensive accord with Iran and Washington pressures Israel to avoid sabotaging the deal, the US could step back and allow regional countries to take greater responsibility for their own security. If Israeli actions pull the US back into sustained conflict, the diversification strategy Gulf states are now building could be undermined before it fully takes hold. Whether the region moves toward a more multipolar security architecture or gets drawn back into superpower-driven confrontation will depend largely on choices made in Jerusalem.