Turkey Pushes to Expand Defense Alliance Beyond Three Founding Members

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan made the expansion agenda explicit on Saturday, telling state news agency Anadolu that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan envisions the pact growing well beyond its founding three members. “Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan said.

The Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement, signed Friday by Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is built around a NATO-style mutual defence clause: an attack on any one member is treated as an attack on all three. Turkish and Saudi officials have been careful to clarify that the pact targets no specific nation, including Iran, and is not designed to displace existing alliances. Turkiye, a NATO member, has framed the accord as complementary rather than competitive.

Additional reference context is available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/9/which-other-countries-could-join-the-turkiye-saudi-pakistan-defence-pact.

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been formally discussed by a signatory. Fidan described Cairo as a “natural partner” and expressed confidence it would eventually join once what he called “technical issues” are resolved. “I believe that at the next stage, Egypt will also be among us in the alliance,” he said, adding that Turkiye and Egypt already function as de facto alliance partners in practice.

The stakes of Egyptian membership are considerable. Ali Bakir, professor of international relations, security and defence at Qatar University, said Egypt’s inclusion would “significantly increase the pact’s political weight, regional influence and operational effectiveness.” Egypt already maintains working relationships with all three signatories through the R4 consultative group and has recently strengthened military ties with Turkiye, despite historical tensions rooted in the 2013 military coup against President Mohamed Morsi, the Libya conflict and Eastern Mediterranean disputes.

Analysts, though, identify real obstacles. Karim Elgendy, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera that Egypt faces a delicate balancing act. “Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” he said. The central question is whether the pact functions as a flexible political framework or as a rigid obligation that could pull Egyptian forces into conflicts driven by other members’ priorities.

The legal dimensions are equally complex. Elgendy noted that Cairo will demand assurances that membership cannot be read as a commitment against Israel or as alignment with Turkiye’s positions in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. Ahmed Aboudouh, also an associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, added that while Egypt shares the pact’s general security concerns, it does not align with the alliance’s foundational threat perception. Cairo has historically preferred narrowly scoped, issue-specific regional arrangements over sweeping defence commitments carrying elevated risks.

Beyond Egypt, several Gulf states have been identified as potential candidates. Former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani expressed hope on X that all Gulf Cooperation Council members would eventually join. The GCC comprises Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Fidan indicated that unnamed countries had already expressed interest, though he offered no specifics.

Among Gulf states, Qatar and Kuwait emerge as the most plausible near-term additions. Both maintain close relationships with all three signatories and faced direct exposure during recent regional tensions, including United States-Israel operations against Iran and Israel’s strike on Doha in September. Bakir identified Qatar as the “most natural” Gulf state prospect and Kuwait as another viable option. He also suggested Azerbaijan, Syria and Jordan could join “relatively quickly.”

By contrast, Elgendy cautioned against reading the pact as a blueprint for a cohesive regional bloc. “This looks like a coalition of the willing that will grow on a case-by-case basis, shaped by each capital’s own risk calculus,” he said. The expansion trajectory will depend on whether individual governments conclude that the strategic benefits of membership outweigh the constraints of binding defence obligations, a calculation that will look different in Amman than it does in Doha or Baku. For further analysis on the pact’s regional implications, see www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/9/which-other-countries-could-join-the-turkiye-saudi-pakistan-defence-pact.