Gulf States Hedge Their Bet on Washington
The outbreak of hostilities between the United States, Israel and Iran has forced the Gulf Arab states into a fundamental recalibration of their security, economic and technological partnerships. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain maintain a public posture of cautious neutrality, but their private strategic calculations have accelerated a multipolar pivot that is steadily eroding the traditional American-led security architecture of the region.
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The conflict has exposed the vulnerabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council members and compelled them to aggressively diversify their international relationships. This diversification is not a rejection of the West, but a pragmatic survival strategy that increasingly favors non-Western powers, including China, India, Pakistan and Turkiye, while simultaneously complicating ties with the U.S. and Europe. The cumulative effect is a transformation of the global order in the Gulf, where economic interdependence and technological acquisition are becoming as vital as hard-power security guarantees.
The U.S.-Iran war has exposed the limitations of American protection, even as Washington has rushed additional naval assets and air defense systems to the Gulf. GCC states have watched with growing unease as the U.S. has struggled to contain Iranian missile and drone strikes on Gulf infrastructure, while simultaneously demanding that these states close their airspace to Russian aircraft and sever economic links with Tehran. That credibility gap has led Gulf capitals to pursue independent defensive arrangements and bilateral security pacts with non-Western powers.
Gulf states have deepened their security dialogue with Turkiye, which has positioned itself as a critical mediator and arms supplier. That relationship now extends to the possible sale of Russia’s S-400 air defense system to a Gulf state. Ankara contracted for four S-400 batteries in 2017 at a reported cost of $2.5 billion, taking delivery in 2019 but never bringing the system into service. This past July, a columnist in the pro-government daily Hurriyet claimed that Turkiye was in discussion on the sale of the batteries to a third country. Reports have named Qatar and the UAE as the likelier recipients, the latter having suffered the heaviest Iranian attacks of the war. Ankara is finding the move complicated, as it must secure Moscow’s approval for the sale while simultaneously pursuing a contentious deal for F-35 fighter jets from Washington. Some speculate that talks on the S-400 transfer have stalled.
The UAE has gone furthest among the Gulf states in openly building out security ties with the U.S. and Israel. A possible acquisition of the S-400 is not merely a matter of hardware purchases but a political signal to Washington that alternative protection exists should Gulf civilian and military interests remain heavily exposed to Iranian attacks.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have agreed significant defense cooperation agreements with Ankara, including joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic warfare systems. The Gulf monarchies have also quietly deepened intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism coordination with Pakistan, which as a nuclear-armed state maintains close ties with both Riyadh and Tehran, making it an indispensable intermediary. Pakistan’s military advisors are now embedded in several GCC command structures, and its naval forces regularly participate in joint exercises in the Gulf.
New partnerships extend to Asia. South Korea continues expanding defense exports to the Gulf states, especially missile systems, naval platforms and armored vehicles. Japan has deepened maritime security cooperation with the GCC, focused on protecting energy shipping lanes, alongside a set of defense industrial agreements. India has become increasingly important not simply as an economic partner but as a security actor. New Delhi’s expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, its defense manufacturing ambitions and its growing strategic dialogue with Gulf capitals make it a valuable partner for maritime security and associated logistics.
Saudi reporting and policy commentary point to Chinese drone production, including a $5 billion factory in Jeddah to assemble Wing Loong-3 unmanned combat aerial vehicles. The UAE Armed Forces have reportedly deployed a Chinese-supplied FK-2000 medium-range defense system in Bahrain, according to Military Watch Magazine. The batteries had been expected to go to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces but were diverted as Iranian missile and drone strikes on the UAE intensified.
The Iran war has made Gulf leaders more skeptical that the U.S. will fully align with their security needs, especially when Washington’s campaign against Iran creates direct retaliation risk for Gulf territory and infrastructure. At the same time, they have not abandoned the U.S. security umbrella. Instead, they are using it while building more autonomous and diversified defense options, including procurement and industrial cooperation with non-Western partners.
Economically, the war with Iran has acted as a catalyst for the Gulf states to accelerate their long-planned economic diversification agendas, with a pronounced pivot toward Asian markets and financing mechanisms that bypass Western financial systems. China has emerged as the undisputed beneficiary of this shift, as Gulf oil and gas exports to Beijing have surged despite previous U.S. calls for supply chain decoupling. The petrodollar recycling loop, once exclusively channeled through New York and London, is now increasingly denominated in Chinese yuan for bilateral trade, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE actively exploring digital yuan pilots for oil settlements.
This is a direct response to the risk of U.S. secondary sanctions and asset freezes, which Gulf leaders fear could be wielded against them if they are perceived as insufficiently aligned with Washington’s Russia and Iran sanctions regimes. Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative has provided the infrastructure financing that Western banks, constrained by geopolitical risk assessments and other considerations, are reluctant to offer, leading to massive Chinese investments in Gulf ports, petrochemical complexes, data centers and renewable energy projects. The UAE’s Khalifa Port and Saudi Arabia’s NEOM mega-project are now heavily integrated with Chinese contractors and technology providers, creating a web of interdependence that makes any future U.S. demand to fully decouple from China economically ruinous for the Gulf.
India has become a crucial economic partner, not only as a vast market for Gulf hydrocarbons but also as a source of skilled labor, food security and pharmaceutical supplies. The India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, signed in February 2022, has nearly doubled bilateral trade, which reached $101.25 billion in the 2025-2026 Indian fiscal year. Similar negotiations with Saudi Arabia are advancing. India’s refusal to condemn Russia’s actions or join U.S.-led naval coalitions has paradoxically made it a more trusted partner for the Gulf. As New Delhi maintains independent relations with Tehran, Moscow and Washington alike, it is a model the region increasingly looks to emulate.
Pakistan offers the Gulf a land bridge to Central Asia and a strategic depth that is invaluable. It has led to Saudi and Emirati investments in Pakistani refineries, mines and agricultural zones, often as a quid pro quo for military cooperation and political support on Kashmir issues that resonate with Gulf publics.
Yet for all the momentum of this Asian pivot, the Gulf’s non-oil economies remain acutely vulnerable to external shocks that hydrocarbon revenues have elsewhere buffered. Tourism, aviation, logistics, real estate and financial services are disproportionately exposed to regional conflict escalation, particularly any direct military confrontation with Iran that could close the Strait of Hormuz, disrupt aviation corridors or trigger a broad insurance-premium spike on Gulf shipping and trade.
Technology relations are moving in the same direction as trade. Gulf states are seeking non-Western options in telecoms, artificial intelligence, data centers, drones and defense-adjacent manufacturing. This is partly about cost and speed, but it is also about strategic autonomy, because digital infrastructure and military production are now treated as national-security assets rather than purely commercial choices. A pattern is emerging in which Riyadh accepts American protection during open conflict while building Chinese and South Korean industrial capacity for the longer term. That model is likely attractive to other Gulf capitals as well, even if they vary in how openly they pursue it.
The U.S. war with Iran has accelerated the flow of Chinese technology firms into the Gulf, particularly in 5G telecommunications, AI, smart cities and surveillance systems. Huawei and ZTE have won major contracts in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, despite intense U.S. lobbying and security warnings. The Gulf states are partnering with China on space technology, satellite launches and lunar exploration, with the UAE’s Arab Satellite 813 successfully launching into orbit aboard China’s Lijian-1 Y11 rocket and Saudi Arabia’s space agency signing framework agreements with Beijing for joint research.
The technological embrace tentatively extends to Russia, with Rosatom at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum reportedly discussing construction of nuclear reactors with Saudi officials and proposing bids for small nuclear power plants with the UAE. The Trump administration’s subsequent offer to provide Saudi Arabia with U.S. civilian nuclear technology demonstrates Riyadh’s growing ability to leverage competition between major powers to secure more favorable strategic and commercial outcomes.
Turkiye’s role in defense tech also extends to fintech, health-tech and agricultural technology, where Turkish start-ups are leveraging cultural affinities to gain footholds in Gulf markets. India’s digital public infrastructure, including its UPI payment system and Aadhaar-style identity platforms, is being studied and emulated by Gulf governments eager to reduce their reliance on SWIFT and Western cloud providers. The overall effect is a deliberate strategy of technological hedging, where Gulf states maintain access to Western innovation primarily through academic partnerships and luxury consumer markets but complement their digital and industrial infrastructure with Asian suppliers who offer fewer geopolitical strings.
The Iran war is profoundly reshaping the Gulf’s ties with the U.S. and Europe, transforming what was once a patron-client relationship into a transactional and increasingly tense partnership. Washington’s demands for unequivocal support against Iran have been met with polite acceptance but also a firm resolve to diversify. Gulf leaders have calculated that overt alignment with the U.S. would make them primary targets for Iranian retaliation, a risk they are unwilling to absorb.