Gulf nations race to rebuild air base defenses after Iranian missile strike

Six months into the Iran war, the missile that struck Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in June 2025 did more than damage infrastructure. It collapsed the distinction between theoretical vulnerability and operational reality.

That strike exposed what planners had long acknowledged in documents but rarely had to manage in practice: cities, energy infrastructure, airports, ports and shipping lanes now face direct threats from missiles, drones and other forms of disruption. Gulf militaries are no longer preparing for these scenarios. They are living inside them.

The security architecture that existed before the war has not failed. It no longer suffices on its own. For decades, the structure was relatively straightforward: the United States provided the primary external umbrella, Gulf states maintained bilateral ties with Washington and other Western capitals, and the GCC offered a regional framework, though defence integration remained uneven. That structure persists. The assumption that it is enough has begun to crumble.

What is emerging instead is a system of overlapping partnerships rather than a single grand alliance. Different countries will work together against different threats. Some arrangements will be Gulf-led; others will bring in regional or Western partners. This flexibility may be the only realistic foundation for deeper security cooperation, but it depends on whether these overlapping relationships can actually connect when they need to.

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan is the clearest recent example of this shift. Its declaration that an armed attack on one would be treated as an attack on all extends the collective-defence logic beyond the GCC, linking Saudi Arabia to partners outside the traditional Gulf framework. The GCC’s existing Joint Defence Agreement already contains this principle. What distinguishes the Mecca agreement is its reach beyond the region’s traditional boundaries.

Comparisons to NATO are understandable but potentially misleading. The Gulf does not need to reproduce NATO, nor is the wider Middle East particularly suited to one large security alliance built around a single hierarchy and a single understanding of threat. The threat facing a Gulf state may come from a state one day and a non-state actor the next. Countries that see one threat in much the same way may have very different views of another. No regional state, however capable, is likely to be accepted as the permanent political and military leader of every possible coalition.

This kind of system requires a different approach to leadership. Leadership should follow the threat. The state facing the immediate danger should have the leading political voice in setting objectives, acceptable escalation levels and the use of its territory. Operational leadership, though, need not mirror political hierarchy. A maritime crisis may be best handled by the partner with the strongest naval capability. An air defence crisis may require the partner with the most relevant systems to take a larger operational role.

Interoperability becomes critical in this framework. If several countries agree that they will support one another in a crisis, can they actually do it? Can they share information quickly, communicate across their militaries, coordinate decisions and know in advance who is authorised to do what? Support can take many forms, from intelligence, air defence and logistics to maritime protection or, in the most serious circumstances, direct military action. The clearer these expectations are before a crisis, the more credible the commitment becomes when one occurs.

Qatar’s military relationship with Britain demonstrates what deeper integration can look like without requiring a large regional institution. British and Qatari personnel have trained and operated Typhoon aircraft together through a joint squadron, while Qatar and Turkey have developed a combined military command structure. These arrangements predate the current war. The UK-Qatar relationship was tested during it: in March, an RAF Typhoon operating with the joint squadron shot down an Iranian attack drone directed at Qatar. Integration does not always have to begin with a treaty signed by ten countries. Sometimes it begins with two militaries learning how to work together properly.

Europe can play a larger role without replacing the United States. Washington will likely remain the Gulf’s most important security partner while Gulf states build deeper operational relationships with Britain, France, Turkey and other capable partners. Gulf and European militaries increasingly face many of the same operational problems: missiles, drones, maritime insecurity, electronic warfare and threats to critical infrastructure. The next stage of Gulf-European defence relations should be judged less by the value of contracts signed and more by whether their forces can actually work together when circumstances require it. That means more exercises, embedded personnel and joint planning, as well as arrangements that allow bilateral partnerships to connect with wider GCC and regional structures.

The Mecca agreement will face the same test. Turkey’s defence ministry has said that the three countries plan political and military coordination, joint exercises, air-defence cooperation and deeper defence-industrial ties. For now, these remain plans rather than proof of operational integration. The agreement’s significance will ultimately depend on whether Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani forces develop habits of cooperation: whether they can share intelligence, coordinate air defence, sustain operations together and use defence-industrial cooperation to solve practical military problems.

Six months in, the outlines of a different Gulf security architecture are beginning to appear. It is unlikely to consist of one alliance, one leader or one definition of the threat. Nor is the Gulf abandoning the United States or dismantling the security relationships that have served it for decades. A more flexible system is taking shape around these existing relationships: stronger Gulf cooperation, additional regional partnerships, deeper links with European militaries and a greater emphasis on whether countries can actually operate together.

Some of this momentum may fade if the immediate threat recedes. The challenge now is to make the lessons of the past six months durable. When the next missile is launched, the next drone crosses a border or the next shipping lane comes under threat, can the countries concerned see the danger together, make decisions together and respond together? If they can, the most important legacy of this war may not be another treaty. It may be the beginning of a Gulf security system that is more connected, more flexible and better suited to the region it is actually meant to protect, and the question of whether that system can be built before the next crisis arrives is one that no agreement, however ambitious, has yet answered.