Beijing gains strategic leverage as Saudi, Turkish, Pakistani militaries align

Three Ways China Benefits From the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan Pact

Last Friday, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed a joint defense agreement, dubbed the Mecca pact, committing each country to treat an armed attack against one as an armed attack against all. The agreement calls for military coordination across intelligence sharing, training, logistics and defense industry cooperation. Its practical significance remains uncertain, but the pact signals a clear effort by regional powers to forge security arrangements that no longer depend entirely on the United States.

That effort is unfolding against the backdrop of a US war in Iran with no clear exit strategy for Washington. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in the American military posture across the Gulf, with US installations coming under repeated Iranian missile and drone attacks. These circumstances have prompted debate in Washington and among Gulf states about whether the US military presence needs to be reconfigured. China has not officially endorsed the pact, but its state-run Xinhua news agency highlighted the agreement as a response to rising regional security concerns.

The pact aligns with Beijing’s long-running argument that Middle Eastern states should shape their own regional security rather than rely on an external power. China has promoted what it calls “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security,” while pushing for an architecture less dominated by outside actors. That positioning creates three distinct avenues through which Beijing could benefit from the Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan agreement.

First, the pact diversifies security arrangements in the Middle East in ways that reduce the central role of the United States. Yun Sun, senior fellow and director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, told Al-Monitor that China has been calling for a regional organic security arrangement more independent from US influence. Beijing has advanced versions of this idea for years. In 2022, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia, China said it would support Gulf states in maintaining their security and building a “new and comprehensive” security architecture for the Gulf.

This does not mean Beijing is looking to replace Washington as the region’s security guarantor. China lacks both the regional military presence and, so far, the appetite to take on that role. But a more diversified security landscape gives Beijing more room to deepen relationships already expanding across the region. A Gulf in which states spread their defense partnerships can be more receptive to Chinese diplomacy, arms sales, technology and investment, without requiring Beijing to provide the kind of alliance guarantee Washington has long supplied.

Second, Pakistan’s role in the pact carries particular significance for Beijing. Pakistan is one of China’s closest defense partners and a major recipient of Chinese arms. The two countries have developed extensive cooperation ranging from fighter aircraft and submarines to joint drone production. Pakistan’s JF-17 fighter, the backbone of its air force, was jointly developed by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group. Pakistan is also the only nuclear power in the pact. According to Sun, given China’s overwhelming influence over Pakistan, its deeper integration into Gulf security arrangements indirectly increases Chinese influence across the region. During a May meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, President Xi Jinping hailed the relationship as “unbreakable.”

As Pakistan becomes more embedded in Gulf security, Chinese-built systems, training networks and maintenance infrastructure could gain a wider regional role. Saudi Arabia has already expanded military and economic cooperation with China in recent years. In March, reports indicated that Riyadh and Beijing had reached a 5 billion dollar agreement to establish a production line for Chinese Wing Loong-3 combat drones in Jeddah. Neither government has publicly confirmed the arrangement, but such a deal would represent a shift from Saudi Arabia simply purchasing Chinese equipment toward producing it locally, deepening Beijing’s footprint in the kingdom’s defense industry.

Turkey, meanwhile, has increasingly prioritized its domestic defense sector and broadened its strategic relationships. Its defense partnership with Pakistan is already substantial, and Saudi Arabia is a major buyer of Turkish drones. For China, that creates a potential opening for overlapping supply chains and joint projects among the three pact members, even if Turkey’s defense ties with Beijing remain less developed than those between China and Pakistan.

Third, the Iran war has underscored the centrality of drones, missiles and air defense in Gulf security. China is well positioned to compete in that market, offering relatively affordable armed drones, air-defense systems and, increasingly, local production partnerships. The reported Wing Loong-3 project in Saudi Arabia illustrates the appeal of that model. Rather than selling a finished platform, China could become embedded in Saudi Arabia’s training, maintenance, supply chain and industrial infrastructure. The reported Jeddah facility would produce roughly 48 drones a year.

Greater defense coordination among Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey may create demand for interoperable systems, shared training and industrial cooperation. Pakistan’s longstanding use of Chinese equipment gives Beijing an inside track in one member state, while Saudi Arabia’s reported drone-production plans could give it a larger industrial foothold in another.

The Mecca pact does not mark a break with the United States. Its members have stressed that it is defensive and does not replace existing agreements, including arrangements with Washington and NATO. But it does point toward a more multipolar Middle Eastern security order, one in which Washington is no longer the unquestioned center of Gulf security. Whether that order actually takes shape depends on how much military coordination the three signatories can sustain in practice, and whether the pact’s commitments hold when tested.