Gulf Oil Infrastructure Faces Six-Month Assault; Iran-Backed Groups Target Refineries, Por

Repeated strikes on Abu Dhabi’s al-Ruways Industrial City, Jebel Ali Port, and Kuwait’s Mina Abdullah oil refinery tell a consistent story: since February 2026, Iran and the groups it backs have run a sustained campaign against the Gulf’s economic backbone, hitting energy facilities, transportation hubs, and commercial zones rather than military installations.

Between late February and late July, Iran conducted at least 172 attacks on critical non-military infrastructure across the six Gulf Cooperation Council states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Those strikes represent roughly 18 percent of all Iranian land-based operations in the region. The targeting has not been evenly spread. The UAE absorbed 28 percent of infrastructure attacks, followed by Kuwait at 25 percent, Bahrain at 20 percent, and Saudi Arabia at 16 percent. Qatar and Oman experienced significantly lower rates.

Additional reference context is available at https://acleddata.com/report/gulfs-critical-infrastructure-presents-lasting-vulnerability-iran-exploit.

Energy infrastructure has borne the heaviest load. Nearly half of all attacks, 48 percent, hit oil facilities, gas installations, power plants, and desalination systems. Airports and ports accounted for 27 percent of strikes. Industrial facilities, financial centers, data centers, and high-rise commercial and residential buildings made up 19 percent, with government and diplomatic sites comprising the remaining 6 percent.

The operational damage has been real. More than 70 percent of attacks on critical infrastructure caused damage or fires at their intended targets. Twenty-five incidents resulted in fatalities or injuries. Even limited damage has disrupted trade flows, energy supply chains, and commercial activity across the region.

The UAE’s experience illustrates the scale of exposure. Repeated strikes hit the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company’s al-Ruways Industrial City, Jebel Ali Port, Abu Dhabi International Airport, the ADNOC Habshan gas complex, data centers, and Khalifa Economic Zones. These are not peripheral targets. They sit at the center of the UAE’s role as a regional investment and technology hub, and the cumulative effect extends beyond physical damage: repeated attacks have eroded the country’s image as a stable destination for business.

Kuwait has faced similarly intensive targeting, with oil refineries at Mina Abdullah and Mina al-Ahmadi, oil rigs, power stations, the Shuayba power and desalination plant, and Kuwait International Airport all struck multiple times. In Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, energy infrastructure remained the dominant focus. Bahrain’s Petroleum Company refinery, Bahrain International Airport, and Khalifa Bin Salman Port were repeatedly hit. Saudi Aramco facilities across al-Jubayl, Ras Tanura, Shaybah, Yanbu, and the Riyadh Diplomatic Quarter came under repeated attack.

The intensity of these strikes has tracked closely with the conflict’s military phases. From late February through early April, infrastructure attacks represented roughly 19 percent of Iran’s retaliatory operations. When a ceasefire took effect and negotiations ran through mid-June, attacks dropped sharply, with Iran shifting focus toward military targets and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. After a memorandum of understanding was signed on June 17, infrastructure targeting resumed, again accounting for approximately 19 percent of Iranian attacks during the subsequent escalation phase. The pattern is consistent: Iran treats strikes on critical infrastructure as a pressure tool calibrated to periods of heightened military tension.

Geographic targeting has also shifted across these phases. During the initial period, the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain faced the greatest exposure. Since mid-June, Iran has not targeted non-military infrastructure in the UAE, Qatar, or Oman. Kuwait and Bahrain have borne the heaviest burden in recent weeks, recording 10 and seven attacks respectively during the latest phase.

By contrast, those variations reflect distinct diplomatic postures. The UAE adopted a more conciliatory approach toward Tehran following the ceasefire, restoring flights and trade while maintaining relations with the United States and Israel. Qatar and Oman have positioned themselves as mediators between Iran and the US, reducing Tehran’s incentive to strike them. Kuwait and Bahrain have maintained hostile stances toward Iran and host significant US military bases; both countries carried out attacks on Iran in early July.

Analysis available at acleddata.com/report/gulfs-critical-infrastructure-presents-lasting-vulnerability-iran-exploit indicates that Kuwait and Bahrain will likely remain the most exposed states if conflict escalates again, though Saudi Arabia’s critical role in global energy markets makes its oil infrastructure an especially valuable target. The July 27 attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqayq facility demonstrated that major oil installations remain in the crosshairs.

Oil and gas facilities, power plants, and desalination systems will almost certainly remain priority targets, given their dual value: disrupting them increases economic pressure on Gulf states while simultaneously affecting global energy supplies. Airports and ports offer similar strategic leverage by interrupting passenger and cargo traffic. The UAE’s diplomatic engagement with Tehran has reduced its exposure in the short term, but that protection is conditional. Should Iran face heavy attacks on its own critical infrastructure, or perceive the UAE as fully aligned with US and Israeli operations, that restraint would likely evaporate. The convergence of high-value targets, demonstrated Iranian capability to penetrate air defenses, and declining interceptor stockpiles across the region leaves the question of sustained vulnerability less about whether the next escalation comes, and more about which facilities absorb the first strikes when it does.